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In that commentary on the great work of Beccaria which is
ascribed to Voltaire, the author speaks of criminal procedure as "a
law which ought certainly to be no less favorable to the innocent than
terrible to the guilty.3  But the aim of Montesquieu and Beccaria, of
Romilly and Brougham has long since been accomplished. In our day,
for English speaking jurisdictions, at least, the pioblem has changed,
the emphasis has shifted. To voice the modem demand, the words of
the commentator require to be transposed. *The need of today is that
criminal procedure shall be "no less terrible to the guilty than favor-
able to the innocent." It is this need which has prompted the call so
frequently uttered during the past quarter of a century for recasting
and reformation. In some jurisdictions the call has been answered
wisely and well. Abroad, England and the British colonies, at home,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, have acknowledged the need,
and met it in excellent measure. But in the United States, generally,
and our own State, in particular, the response has been but feeble
and fragmentary.
It is agreed, on all hands, that in any system of penal justice,
punishment of the guilty as well as acquittal of the innocent should be
swift and certain. But speed and certainty are precisely what our
criminal procedure lacks. In some measure, because of a habit of
mind on the part of lawyers and judges, but largely because of the
refusal on the part of legislators to observe the common sense dictate
that when an instrumentality has served its purpose it should be laid
aside, the processes of criminal law in this State move haltingly
toward an uncertain goal. Too many unnecessary steps are taker/,
too much time is spent on the non-essential, the quest too frequently
becomes a search for the.legalistic rather than the human truth. The
specific faults from which this condition arises have been often pointed
out and remedies efficient to meet them as often proposed, for the
most part in vain. But it. is to be remembered that Lord Eldon
looked upon railroads as dangerous innovations. 4  Some day these
remedies will find lodgment in our statutes, and to hasten that day is
"A paper read before the joint meeting of the Illinois State Society of the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology and the Illinois State Bar
Association, at Danville, Illinois, June 1, 1917.
2Professor of Law in Northwestern University.
3Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, lxxii, London, 1769.4Zane, The Five Ages of the Bench and Bar of England, 1 Select Essays in
Anglo-American Legal History, 724.
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the duty of every lawyer who, with Jeremy Bentham, decries the
"original sin of judicial procedure-the substitution of the actual ends
of judicature for the ends of justice."
Consistently enough with the shifting of emphasis before men-
tioned, one characteristic of the existing condition is precisely that
which in the eyes of the French philosophers of the 18th century
might have passed for a virtue, namely, the tendency to cause a given
case td be viewed abstractly and decided mechanically, by subordi-
nating the verities to an artificial juristic situation-in other words,
the disposition to make the ultimate inquiry, not whether the accused
is guilty or innocent, but whether the requirements of the applicable
legal formula have been in all respects satisfied. It is the "attitude
of record-worship," the "trial of the record rather than the case," to
use the phi-ases of Professor Pound,6 that is here in question. And
the root of this evil is to be found, for the most part, in the present
rules of criminal pleading, particularly in those relating to the fram-
ing of the indictment.
From a superficial examination of the statutory provision that
every indictment "shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct
which states the offense in the terms and language of the statutes
creating: the offense or so plainly that the nature of the offense may
be readily understood by the jury," with the further injunction that
after the caption, the offense and the time and place of its commis-
sion shall be inserted with reasonable certainty-,7 it might be sup-
posed that the task of the pleader need not involve great technical
skill. But in following the course of decision under this section we
become painfully aware that the case is quite otherwise. The "terms
and language of the statute" will not suffice except where the statute
describes the particular act constituting the offense, and the "nature
of the offense" has come to mean something essentially different from
the real signification of the words. And this has been 'brought about
by the application of two common law doctrines, generally followed
in American jurisdictions-first, that the indictment shall set forth
all the juristic elements of the offense, shall allege with completeness
the State's cause of action; and, secondly, that its allegations shall
answer the tesf of certainty as fixed by the common law. It is to
5Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure, c. 29.
6A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, Proceedings of Illinois State
Bar Association for 1910, p. 395; Report of Committee E of the American In-
stitute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 587.7Sec. 6, Div. XI, Criminal Code; Sec. 408, c. 38, Hurd's Statutes, 1913.
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these doctrines that we owe, in large measure, the miscarriages, not
of law, but of justice, which our reports so abundantly disclose.
In any endeavor to improve the system of criminal pleading, with
relation to the indictment, the first thing is to determine the funda-
mental question of procedural polity: Is the office of the indictment
to remain as it is, not only that of furnishing information to the
defendant of what he is charged with, but also and with equal
emphasis that of furnishing a statement of the offenge to the court
and providing a memorial beyond whose borders we need not look
for the legal elements of the crime? In other words, are we to say
that the function of the indictment should be more than that of giving
reasonable notice to the accused, of advising him of what he is called
upon to meet? Every consideration of practical justice requires that
a negative answer be returned. So far as notice to the court is con-
cerned, as distinguished from notice to the accused, the supposed
benefit of this to the defendant, as marked by a learned writer, is that
he is enabled to call for a decision on the sufficiency of the case as
shown on the face of the indictment. But, as this writer says: "Of
what importance is it to the court to know whether or not the facts
alleged constitute an offense, when, after the evidence has been pre-
sented, it will have an opportunity to determine whether or not the
facts proven constitute an offense? *.. * What real difference
can it make to him [the defendant] whether he present a defense
which he has by a plea of not guilty, or by a demurrer? If he is
allowed to present the, particular matter which he wishes to allege
by a plea of not guilty, he is deprived of no substantial right by a
law which abolishes motions to quash. If the right to demur is taken
away, it cannot be said that any constitutional privilege has been
infringed. Nor can it be said that any right of the defendant is
violated if the court is prohibited from deciding the case on the plead-
ings, and is required to decide it on the facts." s So far as concerns
the function which the indictment is supposed to fulfill in providing
a memorial, the sole usefulness with which it is credited is in aiding
the defendant to establish a defense of res judicata. If the defendant
were restricted to record evidence in the presentation of this defense,
or if record evidence would always suffice to establish the identity of
the two offenses, this function might appear an indispensable one.
But everyone knows that the defendant is not confined to record
evidence in this regard. And it is probably not overstating the fact
sCharles A. Willard. The Seventeenth Century Indictment in the Light of
Modern Conditions, 24 Harv. Law Rev. 291.
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to say that the production of the record alone of the former proceed-
ing will seldom make out a case for the defendant. In fact, the
Supreme Court has gone far toward laying the ghost of this supposed
function. Answering the contention in People v. Brady,' that the
statutory form of indictment for practicing the "confidence game'
did not state sufficient facts to enable the defendant to interpose the
judgment as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense,
the court said: "Under the present practice, whether the indictment
is for the same offense as that charged in a former indictment under
which there has been a final judgment is not determined by an inspec-
tion and comparison of the two indictments, under a plea setting up
the former judgment in bar. The defense of former acquittal or
conviction may be made under the plea of not guilty, and on the trial
the party accused and the particular offense may be shown by parol
testimony." It is plain, therefore, that the function which the indict-
ment is crediting with fulfilling in the present respect is one that it
does not adequately fulfill. By dispensing with the necessity of speci-
fying all the legal elements of the offense charged, we change nothing
in the rules relating to proof of a former acquittal or conviction. The
defendant will start by producing the record and follow with parol
evidence if the record does not sufficiently establish the identity
exactly as he does at present. He may, on occasion, be obliged to
resort to parol evidence for something which at present is in the
indictment, but the only difference will be one of degree and not of
principle.
That the function last referred to is one which the indictment is
not constitutionally required to fulfill seems to admit of- no doubt.
And that specification of the juristic elements of the offense is con-
stitutionally necessary beyond the bounds of reasonable notice for any
other purpose cannot well be contended. Although it has been said by
the Supreme Court that the legislature cannot dispense with "a statement
of the essential elements of the crime," the decisions in the two cases
where this expression was used-one of them being People v. Brady,
supra-and the other language employed in the opinions clearly show
that what was meant was not the juristic elements, as such, but the
elements essential to give the defendant notice of- the nature and
cause of the accusation, and that the real test of a constitutional accu-
sation is whether or not it gives such notice.10
Sometimes, indeed, what amounts to reasonable notice to the
9272 Ill. 401. 409.
'oPeople v. Clark, 256 Ill. 14; People v. Brady, supra.
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accused is equivalent to a statement of the legal elements of the crime,
but in frequent instances there is a wide gap between the two. Take,
for example, the statute as to rape." By that statute the offense of
rape has been committed when a male person over the age of seven-
teen years has carnally known a female person, not his wife, under
the age of sixteen years, with or without her consent. Now the essen-
tial elements.of the crime, where there has been consent, are: (1) That
the defendant had carnal knowledge of a female person; (2) that the
female was not his wife at the time of the act; (3) that, at the time,
the defendant was more than seventeen years of age, and (4) that, at
the time, the female was under the age of sixteen years. Does reason-
able notice to the .defendant here require that he be apprised 6f his
.own age at the time of the-offense or that the victim was not then his
wife? Yet today an indictment which omits to state either of these
two facts will not support a judgment of conviction. 12 Take again
the case of perjury committed, in the course of a judicial proceeding.
Some diminution of the old strictness of allegation has been here
effected by statute, but it is still necessary for the indictment to show,
at least by a general averment, that the court in which the proceeding
was pending had jurisdiction of the subject matter.3 That proof of
this fact is essential to conviction, no one can gainsay, but does its
allegation in any. way aid the' defendant in preparing ,for trial? Still
again, take the case of an offense whose prosecution would have been
barred by the statute of limitations except for the fact that defendant
"was not usually and publicly resident within this State" during the
whole or part of the limitation period. Does the defendant need to
be-told of his own absence from the State? Yet, if the date of the
offense appears to be prior to the limitation period; it is held, and
under existing law, correctly held, that the .omission to state the
absence invalidates the indictment.'- If reasonable notice to the
defendant be made the operative test, there will thus become unnec-
essary a class of allegations whose presence does the defendant no
more than an academic good and the public a very appreciable amount
of harm.
It is this-principle of reasonable notice or information which has
obtained entrance into the English Indictments Act of. 1915,1 the
Massachusetts Act of 1899)16 and the draft act prepared by Professor
"Sec. 237, c. 38, Hurd's Statutes, 1913.
2People v. Trumbley, 252 Ill. 29.
"sKizer v. People, 211 I1. 407.
'4People v. Hallberg, 259 Ill. 502.
15 The Indictments Act, 1915, ed. Herman Cohen,-London, 1916.
W6Revised Laws, 1902, c. 218.
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Mikell of the University of Pennsylvania and presented in the report
of Committee E of the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology for 1914.17 The English act contains nine sections lay-
ing down broad lines to be worked out in detail by the rule committee
which it appoints. ]By the central provision of the act, "every indict-
ment shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement
of the specific offense or offenses with which the accused .person is
charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving
reasonable information as to the nature of the charge."18  This is
suuplemented by the- rules adopted under the act, thus: "A count
of an indictment shall commence with a statement of the offense
charged, called the statement of offense. 9 The statement of offense
shall describe the offense shortly in ordinary language, ivoiding as
far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stat-
ing all the essential elements of the offense, and if the offense is one
created by statute, shall contain a reference to the section of the
statute creating the offense.20 After the statement of the offense, par-
ticulars of the offense shall be-set out in ordinary language in which
the use of technical terms shall-not be necessary." 21 As illustrations
,of what is intended to be effected may be cited the following forms
contained in the appendix to the rules, each being preceded with the
title of the court and the allegation "A. B. is charged with the fol-
lowing offense (or offenses) :" In case of murder--"Statement of
Offense: Murder. Particulars of Offense: A on the ...... day of
........... in the county of ................ murdered J. S." In
case of receiving stolen goods--"Statement of. Offense: Receiving
stolen goods contrary to Section 91 of the Larceny Act, 1861. Par-
ticulars of Offense: A. B. on the ...... day of ................ did
receive a bag, the property of C. D., knowing the same to be stolen."
In case of arson--"Statement of Offense: Arson, contrary to section
-3 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861. Particulars of Offense: A. B.
on 'the ...... day of ............ in the county of ................
maliciously set fire to a house with intent to injure or defraud." 22
The Massachusetts Act provides that, in addition to a caption,
the indictment shall contain "a plain and concise description of the
act which constitutes the crime or the appropriate legal term descrip-
17Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 5, 827.
18 Sec. 3 (1).
19Rule 4 (2).2GRule 4 3).21Rule 4 (4).22 lndictments Act, 1915, ed. Cohen, pp. 30, 33, 35.
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tive of such act without a detailed description thereof," that -the
words used in a statute to define a crime or other words conveying
the same meaning, may be used," " and that "the circumstances ot
the act may be stated according to their legal effect, without a lull
description thereof." 21 It also provides that "the court may upon
the arraignment of the defendant, or at any later stage of the pro-
ceedings, order the prosecution to file a statement of such particulars
as may be necessary to give the defendant reasonable knowledge of
the nature and grounds of the crime charged, and if it has final juris-
diction of the crime shall do so at the request of the defendant, if the
charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally
set out." 25 "Fully, plainly, substantially and formally," it may be paren-
thetically observed, is the phrase used in the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights as characterizing the manner of accusation to which the
defendant is entitled." It further provides that "if in order to pre-
pare his defense, the defendant desires information as to the time and
place of the alleged crime or as to the means by which it is alleged
to have been committed, or more specific information as to the exact
nature of the property described as money, or, if indicted for larceny,
as to the crime which he is alleged to have committed, he may apply
for a bill of particulars as aforesaid." Forms of indictment appro-
priate under the act are the following: Murder: "That A. B. did
assault and beat C. D., with intent to murder him, by striking him
over the head with an ax, and by such assault and beating did kill
and murder C. D." Receiving stolen property: "That A. B. one
watch of the value of ........ dollars, the property of one C. D., then
lately before stolen, did buy, receive and aid in the concealment of,
the said A. B. well knowing the property to have been stolen as afore-
said." Arson: "That A. B. maliciously did bum the dwelling house
of C. D. in ................ County." 
27
In Professor Mikell's draft act, it is similarly provided that "(1)
the indictment may indicate the offense by using the specific name
given to the offense by the common law or by a statute" or "(2) that
the indictment may indicate the offense by stating so much of the
offense either in terms of common law or of the statute defining the
offense, or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient
to give the court notice of'what offense is charged." 28 Further, that
23Sec. 17.24Sec. 18.
25Sec. 39.
2GArt. I, Sec. XII.
27Schedule of Forms, Revised Laws, 1902, Vol. II, pp. 1847, 1850, 1851.28Sec. 5.
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when an indictment indicates an offense in either- of these two ways,
"but does not inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation against him, the prosecuting officer may of his own motion
and shall, when ordered by the court, which in all cases shall so order
at the request of the accused, file a bid of particulars as may be neces-
sary to give the. accused information of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." 2 "Nature and cause of the accusation," it
is to be noted, is the more common expression definitive of the defend-
ant's constitutional right to information. In addition, the court is
given power to require a bill of particulars giving the defendant
"-information desirable for the defense of the accused upon the merits
of the case." 30 Under this act,, an indictment for murder not. supple-
mented by bill of particulars would contain the words -"A.. B. mur-
dered .C. D."; an indictment for arson, "A. B. committed arson by
burning the dwelling house of C., D."; an indictment for robbery; "A..
B.. robbed C. D." 1 . .
It will be seen that these three acts agree in providing for (1) a
designation of the offense, and (2) such particulars as, will reason-
ably convey information to the defendant of the offense charged. .The
method is substantially that of charge and specification long obtain-
ing in the practice of military tribunals. Two differences, however,
appear between the English act 6n the one hand and the Masschu-
setts act and the draft act on the other. The first is a difference in
form, namely, that the English act contemplates the inclusion of the
particulars in the indictment, while, under the other two, these are
primarily matters for bills of particulars. But it would be perfectly
practicable under the Massachusetts act to draw the indictment in
such wise as to dispense with the necessity of a bill of particulars, if
such a course was deemed desirable. As to the draft act, the com-
mittee say: "There is nothing in the act to prevent the stating of the
transaction3 2 in the first pleading and the expectation is that * * *
such information will usually be found in the first pleading.3 More-
over, under the draft act, the bill of particulars is taken asi amending
the indictment."4 The second difference is one of substance, and.is
due to the constitutional provisions for notice to the accused, which




s2"Transaction" is the name given in the act to the subject matter 'cf the
specification, "offense" is the name given to the subject matter of the charge.
83 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 5, 828.34Sec. 8.
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lish act proceeds on the theory, as, of course, it may, that, when the
indictment has been drawn in accordance with its provisions and tmose
of the rules, the accused has a right to no more. It does not touch
the pre-existing power of the court to order a bill of particulars, but
this: remains, as before, discretionary. The Massachusetts act recog-
nizes the right of the defendant to have the charge "fully, plainly,
formally and substantially described," as required by the Bill of
Rights, and, while dispensing with the necessity of satisfying this'
right in the indictment itself, makes it the duty of the State to accom-
plish this purpose, on the defendant's request, by bill of particulars.
if he makes no request, his constitutional right will be deemed to have
been waived. The same is true of the draft act, except that here the
constitutional provision kept in view is the one contained in our own
Bill of Rights, namely, that the defendant shall be informed of the
"nature and cause of the accusation." Up to the point of being so
informed the defendant has a right to have the offense described either
by the indictment alone or by the indictment and bill of particulars.
Beyond this point, the acts, in varying terms, both provide for the
discretionary granting of a bill of particulars.3 5
If we should resolve upon the introduction of the salutary prin-
ciple contended for, that of reasonable notice or information to the
accused, pattern and precedent are thus ready to hand.
Along with this principle, and the consequent discarding of the
doctrine that the indictment shall necessarily set forth the legal ele-
ments *of the crime, measures are required to counteract that second
doctrine which has contributed so seriously to reversals of criminal
convictions-the doctrine relating to the certainty requisite in allega-
tion. We shall have to take care that in conveying information to the
accused, the averments shall not be subjected to the over-nice tests
of the present standard. The rule is a well settled one in this State,
that the highest degree of certainty is required in an indictment.36
Sometimes this is spoken of as "reasonable certainty," 37 as "a reason-
able degree of certainty, using the term 'certainty' in its common
law sense." 38 But the difference of name has little effect in the result.
What we have with us is still Coke's "certainty to a certain intent in
general." 30 Illustrations of the pernicious working -of the rule may
s5Massachusetts Act, Sec. 39; Draft Act, Sec. 8.
-6Wilkinson r. People, 226 Ill. 135; People v. Hallbergq, 259 Ill. 502.
37Gunning v. People, 189 Ill. 165.
38Prichard v. People, 149 Ili. 50, 55.
39See Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, I, 281.
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be found without much delving. In Cochran v. People," a prosecu-
tion for abortion, the conviction was set-aside because the indictment
averred that the defendant "did administer and use a certain instru-
ment on one S. R.," without stating the manner of its use. In Gun-
ning v. People,4 where the defendant had been convicted for his offer,
while acting as assessor of the Town of South Chicago, to receive a
bribe in consideration of reducing the assessment on certain real estate
described in the indictment by a lot and block number "in the original
Town of Chicago, together with building thereon known as the Reli-
ance Building * * * in the County of Cook," a reversal ensued
because the indictment did not allege that the premises were situated
in the Town of South Chicago. In Prichard v. People,4 2 the indict-
ment charged that the defendant, Joseph Ferguson Prichard, being
married to one Eliza Ann Sweet, known as Eliza Ann Prichard, mar-
ried one Virginia M. Lewis, "well knowing that the said Eliza Ann
Ferguson, his former wife, was then alive." Here the absence of a
direct allegation that Eliza Ann Prichard was then living and the
obviously inadvertent substitution of the name "Eliza Ann Ferguson"
for "Eliza Ann Prichard" were held fatal to the conviction. Other
examples of this same default in certainty are the failure to set out
a literal copy or aver the copy set out to be a literal copy of an instru-
ment alleged to be forged,43 the failure to negative a statutory excep-
tion,44 the failure to specify the coins or bills which were the subject
of a pecuniary larceny,4" the failure to specify the juristic nature of
the ownetr of stolen goods where that owner, is other than an indi-
vidual.40  Here, too, belongs the matter of technical terms. "Certain
technical terms," says a writer experienced in criminal practice, "must
be borne in mind constantly in the preparation of the indictment. If
the statute says that a thing 'wilfully and maliciously' done is an
offense, the statutory words must be averred and to omit them is fatal.
This applies to 'corruptly,' %urglariously' and many other words used
by the statute in the specific offense." 47
To attain fully the object in view-that of making it clear that
the "highest degree of certainty" test is once and for all laid aside-
will require a number of detailed rules. At the outset.will be useful
40175 111 28.
41189 Ill. 165.
42149 Ill. 50.43People v. Tilden, 242 IIl. 536.44Lequat v. People, 11 Ill. 330.45People v. Hunt, 251 Ill. 446.46People v. Brander, 244 Il1. 26.47Thomas Marshall, The Preparation of Indictinents, 6 Ill. Law Rev. 162.
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some such general rule as the following from the draft act: "No
indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient for the reason
merely that it alleges indirectly or by inference, instead of directly,
any matters, facts and circumstances connected with or constituting
the offense, provided that the nature and cause of the accusation can
be understood by a person of common understanding." " This might
well be associated with the English rule generally applicable to descrip-
tion that "it shall be sufficient to describe any place, time, thing, mat-
ter, act, or omission * * * in ordinary language in such a manner
as to indicate with reasonable clearness the place, time, thing, mat-
ter, act or omission referred to." "
Following general provisions of this character would come other
rules providing that certain requirements due to specific application
of the present test should no longer obtain. It will have to be con-
sidered, for example, how far we may dispense with the allegation
of the means of commission. In England, it was provided by statute,
as long ago as 1861, that in cases of murder the manner or means of
causing the death need not be set forth.,0 This, likewise, is the present
rule in something like twenty American states. Under the Massachu-
setts act"' and the draft act,52 the means in no case need be stated
unless they are essential to the designation of the crime. Under the
former, as already seen, they are expressly mentioned as the proper
subject of a bill of particulars, 3 the granting of which, however,
would be discretionary where their statement would not be essential
to a compliance with the constitutional requirement. There is no
such express mention in the draft act, but the general provision as
to bills of particulars would permit like information under a like
condition.
The matter of time and place will similarly demand attention.
Here the Massachusetts act and the draft act, in harmony with the
rule obtaining in England since a statute of 1851,-- do not require the
allegation of time, except when it is of the essence of the offense.
They both apply the like rule to place. Unless otherwise stated the
time is taken to be a time before the finding of the indictment, after the
act became an offense and within the limitation period, and the place, a
48Sec. 30.
49Rule 8.
5024 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 6.
51Sec. 21.52Sec. 12.
3See. 39.
5414 & 15 Vict., c. 100, s. 24.
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place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court- 5 But the grant-
ing by bill of particulars of information relating to time and place is
governed in each by the same considerations which apply to the
means of commission.
Such rules should also be directed to the question of the descrip-
tion of property. The English rule in this regard is that the descrip-
tion "'shall be in ordinary language, and such as to indicate with
reasonable clearness the property referred to." 56 - In particular, the
enumeration of so many coins, so many bills, etc., in describing money
should cease to be necessary, in any case. This requirement likewise
was done away with in England in 1851.57 There, consequently, it is
no new thing "to describe coifi or bank notes as money without speci-
fying any particular coin or bank riote." 53 ' The draft act has a pro-
vision to the same effect and extends the principle to every species
of negotiable security."' And, subject to the express statutory refer-
ence to a bill of particulars in such instance, the same is true of the
Massachusetts act.66  By the draft act, moreover, non-negotiable
securities may be described in the indictment as "funds." 6 '
The connected questions of, value and ownership should' also
receive attention. In England, by the act of 1851, already mentioned,
it was provided, that the absence" of a statement of price or value
should not vitiate the indictment except where-price or value is of
the essence of the offenge.62  This particular provision is -repealed by
the new legislation; but in the rules it is substantially -re-enacted by the
provision that value need not be stated except where 'the offense
depends "on any special value' of property.63  The other two pro-
cedures in question conctir, in this principle.6 4  With a rule of this
sort it would be necessary, for instance, in a charge of larceny to
show on what side of' the statutory dividing line the value of the
property falls. But .here it should be possible, as it would be under
a provision like those of the Massachusetts act and the draft act, -to
allege that the value was less or more- than fifteen dollars without
specifying any amount.65 Ownership, under the English rule,-is treated
55Massachusetts Act, Sec. 20, Draft Act, Sees. 11, 12.
5GRule 6 (1).
57 14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, s. 18.
58Archbold's Criminal Pleading, 23 ed., p. 77.
59Sec. 21.6oSec. 23.
61Sec. 21.
6214 & 15 Vict., c. 100, s. 24; Bowen-Rowlands Criminal Proceedings; 2- ed.,
p. 157.
63 Rule 6 (1).'64Massachusetts Act, Sec. 24; Draft Act, Sec. 14.
65Massachusetts Act, Sec. 24; Draft Act, Sec. 14.
REPORM OF CRIMINAL PLEADING
on the same basis as value. It is not to be stated except where the
offense depends on "any special ownership." 6 The Massachusetts
act similarly provides that if the property is sufficiently described in
other respects to identify the act, the name of the owner need not
be alleged while the draft act goes perhaps a little farther than either
of the others, dispensing with the allegation of ownership except
where necessary to indicate the offense. 7  Under this head would
also come a provision solving the .difficulty which is presented when,
in a case where ownership has to be alleged it is found to be vested
in a voluntary society or unincorporated association composed of a
large'number of members. The English rules reach this by providing
that it shall be enough, in such case, to lay the ownership in one of
the members "with others," or to use the collective name if there be
one.68 The draft act adopts the same method "for the purpose of
identifying any group or association" generally."s And a further
valuable contribution of the draft act in this particular is the pro-
vision "that it is not necessary for such purpose of identification to
state the legal form of such group or association of persons or any cor-
poration.7' The propriety of such a rule is emphasized by recollec-
tion of People v. Brander71 where an indictment charging embezzle-
ment from the "American Express Company, an association," was
held, insufficient to support a-conviction, on the ground that it lacked
"any averment of ownership in any person, firm, corporation or other
entity that may be the owner of property." 71
A further result of the existing test calling loudly for modifica-
tion is the one which requires that "every indictment for forgery or
other crime, the essence of which consists in the publication or fabri-
cation of a written instrument," 7 must not only set out the instru-
ment in haec verba, but must profess to so set it out. The case of
People v. Tilden, exhibits the unfortunate effect of this requirement.
There, though the indictment had set forth the instrument apparently
in the precise terms proved at the trial, the conviction could not stand
because the prefatory allegation used the expression "in words and
figures in substance as follows," instead of "in words and figures as
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indictment ought to be sufficient if it identifies the instrument. Here
the English rule is that "when it is necessary to refer to any docu-
ment or instrument in an indictment, it shall be sufficient to describe
it by the name or designation ,by which it is usually known or by the
purport thereof, without setting out any copy thereof." 74 In England
this change in the common law rule dates from the statute of 1851."M
In this country, also, statutes dispensing with the necessity of setting
out a copy are to be found in a number of jurisdictions. The Massa-
chusetts act' and the draft act likewise render this unnecessary."M
Under such a provision, therefore, it would be in the discretion of the
court, in the given case, as to whether the accused ought to be fur-
nished with a copy of the instrument in a bill of particulars, but the
inclusion of the copy in the indictment would under no circumstances
be essential to the validity of the judgment.
It should be further provided that a statutory exception need not
be negatived by the indictment. The distinction between exception
and provisos so often depends upon mechanical considerations, that
no prejudice will be worked to the defendant by relegating, in plead-
ing, all exceptions to the present sfatus of provisos. Under the exist-
ing rule the validity of a conviction may turn upon a tenuous question
of statutory construction in nowise affecting the merits of the case. 77
This change has been effected by the English rules78 and the draft
act.70 The Massachusetts act after recognizing what, in part, at least,
is the rule obtaining in this State that there need be no negativing of
"an excuse, exception or proviso which is not contained in the enact-
ing clause * * * or which is' stated only by reference to other
provisions of the statute, * * * unless it is necessary for a com-
plete definition of the crime," distinctly provides that "if a statute
which creates a crime permits an act which is therein described to be
performed without criminality, under stated conditions, such condi-
tions need not be negatived." 80
By the same token, it should not be incumbent upon the State to
negative in the indictment an exception to the statute of limitations.
Logically, initial proof that the prosecution is barred should be for
the defense, as in common law causes, and the indictment ought to be
74Rule 8.
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sufficient if it shows a prima facie case apart from the question of
time. There is really no good reason why a defendant who seeks to
shield himself under this defense should not be required to plead the
statute. The three procedures under discussion seem to preserve the
practice in this regard as it stands with us, but the rule suggested has
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States,8' as well
as by the courts of South Carolina,82 Mississippi,"3 and Color-
ado.s4 In the Mississippi case passing on this question, it was said: "A
statute of limitations is never part of an offense, but always a matter
of defense, nor is any allusion to time contained in our statute relative
to grand larceny. It will be time enough, therefore, for the district
attorney to plead the exceptions to the statute when the statute itself
has been pleaded by the accused. No sound rule of pleading can
require him, in preferring the indictment, to anticipate the defense,
and. negative it by setting forth the facts which render it unavail-
ing." 85
Another suggestion which commends itself is that concerning
allegations in the alternative. Although the rule is that "where a
statute forbids several things in the alternative, it is usually construed
as creating but a single offense, and the indictment may charge the
defendant with committing all the acts using the conjunction 'dnd,'
where the statute uses the disjunctive 'or,' ",86 yet cases may arise
where such construction cannot be put upon the statute., It should
bq allowable, therefore, to charge the act or omission in the dis-
junctive. The same thing is true of the intent in cases where the act
may have been done with one of several differ'ent intents. Allegations
in the alternative are provided for by all three procedures under dis-
cussion. By the Massachusetts act "different means or intents," 88 and,
by.the draft act, "different acts, means, intents or results," 89 may be
alJeged in the alternative, while under the English rules, it is "acts,
omissions, capacities or intentions or other matters stated in the alter-
native in the enactment" which may be thus charged. 0
To these topics, therefore, with others which experience and
81United States v. Cook. 17 Wall. 168.
82State v. Howard, 15 Rich. Law (S. C.) 274.
8Thompson v. 'State, 54 Miss. 740.
84Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387: Packer v. People, 26 Colo., 306.
ZsThonzpson v. State. suzera. p. 744.
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study may suggest, should 'be addressed the rules auxiliary to the
purpose of preventing "reasonable notice" from being confounded
with that "reasonable certainty of allegation" which confessedly
implies the highest degree of certainty. Some of the changes recom-
mended might be held not fully to consist with the constitutional
requirement, but as to these, the burden can be cast upon the defend-
ant, as in Massachusetts, to demand such further statement as the
constitutional words may entitled him to. But in most cases the
change can be made without trenching upon the constitutional pro-
vision in the original statement. In most cases, that is to say, with
the change effected, the indictment will sufficiently state the "nature
and cause of the accusation" without giving the defendant any abso-
lute right to amplification or supplement. Though, in this State, we
cannot pretend to be aught but laggards in the march of procedural
reform some steps have been already taken in the direction indicated,
some legislative precedent furnished for cutting down the common
law doctrine of certainty in the indictment. For one thing, there is
the statute with reference to arson, under which it is sufficient to
charge the burning of a "building the property of another," ', without
describing the building as would be required by the common law rule.
In giving this construction to the statute, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the principle which justified all such changes. The defendants
said the court "were as well informed of the particular offense with
which they were accused as if the indictment had described the build-
ing. If the indictment should be held insufficient, it would not be
because, as a matter of fact, plaintiffs in error were not apprised of
the particular offense with which they were charged. It would have
to be because the indictment did not describe the building with the
'technical niceties' of the common law precedents. It would not be
because plaintiffs in error were injured or suffered any prejudice
because the building was not particularly described, but because the
indictment did not meet the technical requirements of the common
law rule, founded upon good reasons at the time of its adoption, but
which reasons do not now exist in this State." 92
Then, again, there is the statute as to embezzlement which has
made it sufficient in all such cases to allege generally in the indict-
ment an embezzlement, fraudulent, conversion, or taking with intent of
funds of a person, bank, incorporated company, or co-partnership to a
certain value or amount, "without specifying any particulars of such
91Sec. 19, Criminal Code, Hurd's Statutes, 1913, p. 800.
92people v. Covitz, 262 Ill. 514, 520-1.
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embezzlement." '3 In the absence of this rule, said the Supreme
Court, "it would be difficult to make the proof and the allegations of
the indictment correspond." " And in a later case, the court, declining
to hold erroneous the refusal of the lower court to grant a bill of par-
ticulars, speaks of the statutory indictment as "sufficiently specific to
advise the plaintiff in error of the charges he was required to meet." ",
Another statute of the sort is that relating to perjury and subor-
nation of perjury, which, though preserving in a milder form than
existed at common law the requirement before referred to that the
court wherein the false oath was made shall be shown to have juris-
diction of the subject matter, does relieve the pleader entirely from
other consequences of the common law rule, that is to say, from set-
ting forth the proceedings at large, the commission and authority of
the court and the form of the oath, with its mode of administration. 8
But the furthest step which has been taken in this direction'is
the statute in relation to the "confidence game." The form of charge
here given the stamp of approval is that the defendant "did on, etc.,
unlawfully and feloniously obtain (or attempt to obtain, as the case
may be) from A. B. his money (or property) by means and by use
of the confidence game." 17 The history of decision under this enact-
ment may be found'in the case, already mentioned in another con-
nection of People v. Brady."8 Originally attacked in 1868, in Morton
v. People,99 the provision has repeatedly been held not to violate the
constitutional requirement. In People v. Clark,00 the conclusion was
reached that the indictment need not describe the money so obtained
or state its amount, and People v. Brady held valid an indictment for
obtaining property which stated neither the description nor the value
of the property.
This line of cases in particular, affords promise that alterations
of the kind under review may be in large part accomplished in the
contents of the accusation without impairing the right to knowledge
of its nature and cause. In People v. Clark, supra, the court refers
with approval to the Michigan case of Brown v. People,101 as hold-
ing "that the provision of the constitution was not intended to pre-
03Sec. 82, Criminal Code, Hurd's Statutes, 1913, p. 820.
94Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 647.






vent the legislature from dispensing with matters of form only in
the description of an offense, nor with any degree of particularity or
specifications which did not give to the defendant substantial and reli-
able information of the particular offense intended to be charged and
without which he would receive substantially the same information."
And in People v. Brady, supra, it was said: "The indictment here
charges the accused obtained 'the property' of Douglas Flake by
means of the confidence game. That informed him of the nature and
cause of the accusation and was sufficient. * * * Defendants
were in no way prejudiced because the indictment did not aver the
property to be a stock of goods. Of course, it can be imagined that
because there is real property and several kinds of personal property,
a defendant might not know which kind of property he was charged
with obtaining, but it is hardly imaginable that when the person from
whom he was charged with obtaining it is named, he would not know
the kind or character of the property. Legislative acts should not be
held invalid upon any such supposititious theory. * * * The
object of the constitutional provision is notice to the accused, and
when the statute so individuates the offense that an indictment in
its language is -notice to the defendant of the nature and cause of the
charge and what he is really to be tried for it is sufficient." 102
No doubt, in the light of the arguments advanced in the minority
opinion People v. Brady, was a departure in some measure from the
older standards, but it has definitely opened a way to rationalization
of the indictment.
The propriety granted of a set of rules such as indicated, the
question remains as to the manner, extent and effect of objections to
the accusation. Under the English act, "notwithstanding any rule
of law or practice, an indictment shall subject to the provisions of
this Act and not be open to objection in respect of its form or contents
if it is framed in accordance with the rules under this act." I's As
the new act does not deal with the mode of objection, failure to com-
ply with the act and rules, in the allegations of the indictment would
be taken advantage of either by demurrer or motion to quash. But
note this further provision: "When before trial or at any stage of a
trial it appears to the- court that the indictment is defective, the court
shall make such order for the amendment of the indictment as the
court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case, unless
having regard to the merits of the case, the *required amendments
1 0 2Pp. 406, 407.
' 03Sec. 3 (2).
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cannot be made without injustice. * * *""3a In inost instances,
therefore, the objection would have no serious result, for wherever
it could be obviated without actually prejudicing the defendant an
amendment would be permitted. Presumably, the rule in question
would not allow any amendment after verdict, but even before the
act, partly no doubt because of the attitude of the courts, partly
because of aider by verdict, common law and statutory,1 4 the situation
was such that writing in 1910 a learned writer could say that "a
motion in arrest of judgment is rarely successful." 105 And since
in no case need there be interference on the part of the Court of
Criminal Appeal "if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of
justice has occurred," 10 it is plain that there is slight margin, under
the English practice for the kind of objection with which we are
too familiar.
The Massachusetts act contains no provision authorizing amend-
ment of the indictment. But, under its theory, as previously explained,
the same purpose is accomplished by bills of particulars. Even though
the indictment does not "fully and plainly, formally and substantially"
inform the defendant of the change, yet if it complies with the statu-
tory provisions, the defendant's remedy is not by demurrer or motion"
to quash, but by application for bill particulars. "Of course," as said
by the Supreme Judicial Court, "the bill of particulars cannot enlarge
the scope of the indictment. It cannot specify a charge not covered
by the indictment. Its only purpose is to specify more particularly
the acts constituting the offense." 107 The great virtue of this plan,
however, is that upon failure to move for a bill of particulars it fore-
closes all objections relating to the lack of certainty or lack of speci-
fication of the elements of the crime. If the court should refuse a
bill of particulars granting information to which the defendant has an
absolute right in order to be constitutionally informed of the charge,
then this would be set right on appeal. For example, in Common-
wealth v. Sinclair,'" a prosecution for causing death with intent to
produce a miscarriage, the upper court went to what would seem the
unnecessary extent of holding that the defendant was entitled to a
new trial, for the refusal of the court below to order particulars of
the instrument which the defendant was charged with using, on the
ground that the description of the instrument was substantially essen-
lo3aSec. 5 (1).
04Archbold, Criminal Pleading. 23 ed., pp. 84, 226.
105Bowen-Rowlands, Criminal Proceedings, 2 ed., p. 274.
'o0 Sec. 4 (1), Criminal Appeals Act, 1907; Boulton, Criminal Appeals, p. 14.07Commonwealth v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 320.
108195 Mass. 100.
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tial to the validity of an indictment for the offense in question before
the passage of the act. But in the same case it was held that a motion
to quash for the lack of the description had been properly overruled.
The motion to quash or demurrer, therefore, as well as the motion in
arrest, it would appear, can only operate upon the original indictment,
in the simple form to which it is reduced, upon the charge, that is to
say, as distinguished from the specification, and the charge alone, if
properly stated, will support the judgment.
In this regard the draft act, proceeding on the same plan, is more
explicit and effectual. To quote from the committee's report: "The
first pleading on the part of the State * * * need only state the
offense which is to be proved against the person accused. If this be
stated such pleading is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and if
the accused requires 'no further information, it is sufficient to warrant
and sustain a trial and judgment." "' The indictment is "valid," if it
indicates the offense in the general way already pointed out. It is
"valid and sufficient" if in addition to so indicating the offense it "con-
tains so much detail of the circumstances of the transaction and such
particulars as to the person (if any) against whom and the thing (if
any) in respect to which the offense was committed as are necessary
to identify the transaction and to give the accused reasonable notice
of the facts." 110 Further provision is that no indictment which indi-
cates the offense in the general way mentioned "shall be quashed, set
aside or dismissed, nor shall any demurrer thereto be sustained on
the ground that it fails to identify the transaction, but the accused
shall in such cases be entitled to a bill of particulars." "' The only
case apparently in{ which a bill of particulars can be looked to on
motion to quash is where it discloses that the statute of limitations
has run, and here the prosecution is permitted to file a new bill if it
can show otherwise. 12 Moreover, it is expressly stated that no indict-
ment is to be held invalid because of "any defect, imperfection or
omission in the manner of charging the offense, or describing the
transaction, provided that the indictment indicates an offense" as
before prescribed. Amendment of the indictment is permitted. "The
court may at any time amend the indictment in respect to any such
defect, imperfection or omission,118 and in case the defendant in the
opinion of the court, 'has been actually misled and prejudiced in his
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defense upon the merits by any such defect, imperfection or omission'
there may be a postponement of the trial." 114 Finally, there occurs
this significant clause: "No motion made after verdict nor writ of
error or appeal based upon any such defect, imperfection or omission
* * * shall be sustained unless it be affirmatively shown that the
defendant was, in fact, prejudiced in his defense upon the merits and
a failure of justice has resulted." 115
The question of variance is also important in the present con-
nection. The new English act contains no provision on this subject.
But by legislation, dating back to 1848 and 1851, a curative amend-
ment is in England permitted where the variance relates to written or
printed matter,116 and in all cases where. it relates to place, name or
description of the owner of property or the person injured, description
of ownership of property, or description of any matter or thing men-
tioned, is not material to the indictment, and cannot prejudice the
accused in his defense on the merits.1"7 The amendment may occur
at any time before the case goes to the jury, and, if necessary, the
court may postpone the trial.'18 One amendment, however, is all that
may be made."-9
By the Massachusetts act, "if there is a material variance betveen
the evidence and the bill of particulars, the court may order the bill
of particulars to be amended, and may postpone the trial." 120 Apart
from this amendment of the bill of particulars, there is to be no
acquittal of the defendant on the ground of variance, "if the essen-
tials of the crime are correctly stated, unless he is thereby prejudiced
in his defense." 121 Precisely what is here meant by "essentials of the
crime" is open to doubt. To interpret the expression as meaning the
"legal elements of the crime" would be in conflict with the principle
of the act. It would be more logical to treat it as meaning the "essen-
tial8" of the crime necessary to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments. In either event, it is a provision calculated greatly to lessen
unmeritorious objections on the present score.
. Preserving a like attitude to that which it has toward defects in the
indictment, the draft act offers even less room than the Massachusetts
act for objections because of variance. If the indictment identifies
114Sec. 38.
"15 Sec. 38.
11611 & 12 Vict., c. 46, s. 4.
11712 & 13 Vict., c. 45, s. 10.
Ll8zItnd.; Bowen-Rowlands, Criminal Proceedings, 2 ed., pp. 244, 245.




the offense in the general way before described, no variance between
the allegations identifying the transaction contained in the indictment
or bill of particulars whether amended or not, and the evidence shall
be ground for acquittal, but the court is given full power at any time
to amend so to conform the allegations to the evidence. -2 As in the
case of a defect in the indictment, if the defendant, in the opinion of
the court has been "misled and prejudiced in his defense upon the
merits" by such variance, the court is given power to postpone the
trial."2 3 So, too, no objection on the score of variance after verdict
will be sustained unless prejudice in defending upon the merits and
a failure of justice are affirmatively shown.'24
These three procedures, then, furnish a sourcs from which we
can draw in a recasting of the present rules relating to the indictment.
As between the English act and the other two, the operative principle
of the latter seems to commend itself for adoption. The general
-charge, with its minimum requirements, supplemented by specification
in the indictment itself or in a bill of particulars, is not only the more
flexible procedure of the two, but is one which is admirably adapted to
meet the demands of constitutional definition.
That we could constitutionally go as far as Massachusetts seems
undeniable, for as has been seen, the provision in the Massachusetts
Bill of Rights appears a more formidable obstacle than our own. If
the plan adopted complies with the requirement that the defendant
shall have the charge described to him "fully, plainly, substantially and
formally," as has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Judicial
Court, 2 5 it should certainly not offend the requirement that he be
informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation." And in cir-
cumscribing the boundaries of that description to which the defendant
is entitled as a matter of constitutional right, the cases before Men-
tioned, and, particularly People -v. Brady, would seem to augur our
ability to go considerably further than Massachusetts has ventured.
A statute, allowing amendments to the indictment would be a
valuable adjunct. The constitutional question here involved, how-
ever, is ohe that demands an independent consideration. But, judg-
ing by the current of decision in other states, a statute could be validly
passed providing, at least, for the cure by amendment of variance in
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before or at the trial. 26 Once we trenched on the domain of sub-
stance, however, the absence of prejudice to the defendant would prob-
ably not be regarded as a sufficient reason for supporting the stat-
ute.1 -2 7 And while it is possible that a statute allowing amendment of
the indictment to the extent contemplated in the draft act would be
approved, it is quite clear that, without a constitutional amendment,
we should be compelled to forego any such comprehensive provision
as that of the new English act.
Improvement of criminal pleading thus finds its chief task in
renovation of the rules relating to the accusation. But it ought not to
stop there. If the requirement of reasonable notice should obtain in
favor of the accused, it should also obtain, within limits, at least, in
favor of the State. Under the' existing practice in Illinois, which
permits any defense in bar to be shown under the plea of not guilty,
there is no such thing as notice, reasonable or otherwise, of the defense
which Th-e State is called upon to meet. To begin with, the common
law rule requiring former conviction or acquittal to be the subject of
a special plea, should be restored in principle. The defense of insan-
ity at the time of the offense ought to be specially stated. This is
already required in a number of jurisdictions. As appears from the
statutory provisions collected in the report of Committee B of the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology for 1911,28
New York, Alabama, Louisiana and Washington all demand that the
State be given notice of an intended defense of insanity. Consistently
with the recommendation that the State be exempted from negativing
an exception to the statute of limitations, this defense should also be
specially pleaded. Self defense should be similarly treated. And
finally, the guilty defendant should be withdrawn from the shelter of
that classic bulwark-the defense of alibi-by requiring that if an
accused proposes to show that he was not present at the scene of the
crime he must apprise the State to that effect. If the indictment does
not state the time of the offense, this information can be obtained by
applying for a bill of particulars. The suggestions as- to self defense
and alibi come from the criminal procedure of Scotland, in which
these defenses, as well as the defense of insanity at the time of the
offense, or that the accused was asleep at the time of the offense, or
1261 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, s. 96, et seq.; 22 Cyc. 434, et seq.; 1
Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 695 et seq.
2 See State v. Startup, 39 N. J. L. 423.
128Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 3, 890; 4 id. 67.
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that the crime was committed by another person named, must be
specially notified to the prosecution.
1 29
So far as the defenses of former jeopardy and statute of limita-
tions are concerned, it would seem more in accord with sound prin-
ciple to make these the subject of special pleas, as were former
acquittal and conviction under the common law practice. Notice of
the other defenses mentioned, viz.: Insanity, self-defense and alibi
should more appropriately come by way of a written specification
under the plea of not guilty, as is now the rule in New York with
reference to insanity. But the allegations of every such plea or notice
should be tested not by the common lawvrule of certainty applicable to
pleas, but by the same criterion as that which should be applied to the
accusation; that is to say, reasonable notice to the opposite party. The
degree of explicitness entailed by the test will vary with the defense.
In the case of former jeopardy an indication of the former proceed-
ings upon which the defendant relies would in most instances suffice.
A plea of the statute of limitations would sufficiently show the defense
by a statement that more than the statutory period has elapsed sin~e
the commission of the crime. Insanity and self-defense would require
no more than a brief indication that these defenses were to be relied
on. In the case of alibi, however, the usefulness of the notice would
largely depend upon the defendant stating where he was at the time
of the offense. While requiring this might at first sight make it appear
that we were holding the defendant to a greater degree of specifica-
tion than the State, there is here ample reason for insisting that he
furnish the information in question, for the defendant, if any one,
absolutely knows where he was and what he was doing when the
crime was being committed. There is a wide difference between speci-
fication here and specification; for example, of the manner and means
of a murder. In the Scottish practice notice of self-defense is accord-
ingly in general terms, while the notice of alibi states particularly
where and in whose company the accused was on the occasion of the
offense. 30
Pleas and 'notices of this character should be amendable in ffir-
therance of justice on substantially the same terms as the indictment
or bill of particulars under the indictment ought to be, so that no
fault in their structure shall serve to prejudice the defendant. If such
an amendment made at the trial would prejudicially surprise the State,
' 29Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure according to the Law of Scot-
land, p. 73; Macdonald, Criminal Law of Scotland, 3 ed., p. 424.
' 30Renton and Brown, op. cit., p. 319.
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trial would preserve the balance of fairness between the State and
the accused.
By the requirement of notice in such cases, and possibly in other
instances, we place the State on an approximately equal basis with the
theA a provision enabling the court, in that event, to postpone the
defendant in respect to advance knowledge of their mutual conten-
tions. Such a thing, to take the most obvious example as a manu-
factured alibi, will be difficult of accomplishment, for the State upon
being notified can immediately take steps to inquire into the truth of
the defendant's statement. And, with proper safeguards as to amend-
ment, there is nothing in such a requirement that will lessen in any
degree the protection which the law accords, and ought to accord, to
an innocent defendant.
For the reform of criminal pleading, as a whole, the data which
have thus been reviewed plainly mark the direction which our efforts
should take. With their aid may be constructed a system which,
retaining the solid virtues of the existing one, will strip it of all that
constituted a reproach to our common sense. When we come into pos-
session of such a system, reinforded, as it should be, by those modifica-
tions so urgently needed in other departments of our criminal pro-
cedure, we shall be able to say, as does a noted English barrister with
reference to the new English act: "If hereafter a man who is proved
by the evidence to be guilty is acquitted, the law will not be to blame,
but the blame will rest with the judge or jury, or both.131
3'3 Sir Harry B. Poland, Introduction to The Indictments Act, 1915, ed.
Cohen, p. 2.
